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COMMON defense of flexible exchange rates is
that they insulate the domestic economy and money
supply fromforeign monetary disturbances.’ This view
has been challenged by a number ofcritics who ques-
tion the assumption behind the monetary indepen-
dence argument that domestic and foreign currencies
arenot considered substitutes indemand by domestic
residents.2 A rational holder of money balances, these
critics argue, would seek to diversify his portfolio of.
currencies forthe same reasons that investors typically
hold diversified portfolios of interest-earning assets. If
currencysubstitution exists, domestic moneydemand
should be sensitive to changes in both domestic and
foreign influences. Consequently, even with flexible
exchange rates, the existence of currencysubstitution
exposes the domestic economy to monetary shocks
from both home and abroad.
The purpose of this article is to assess empirically
the importance of currency substitution in five major
industrial countries by examining the significance of
changes in the opportunity costs of holding foreign-
currency-denominated money balances on the de-
mand for domestic money. If currency substitution
exists, changes in the opportunity costs of holding
foreignmoneybalances should generate areallocation
of money holdings and, consequently, influence
domestic money demand. The evidence presented
here, however,indicates that the impact of changes in
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‘The case tor flexible exchange rates is made forcefully in Friedman
(1953). In this analysis, we ignore the possibilitythat rnonetarydistur-
bances in a flexible exchange rate world may have real conse-
quences as goods prices change more slowly than do exchange
rates. For a discussion of this, see Dornbusch (1976).
2For a discussion ofthese arguments, known collectively ascurrency
substitution, see, amongothers, Miles(1978a, b), Boyer (1978) and
McKinnon (1982). Alternative viewpoints are presented in Chrystal
(1977) and Spinelli (1983).
the opportunity cost of holding foreign money bal-
anceson domestic money demand isstatistically insig-
nificant for almost every country analyzed. Thus, it
does riot appear that currency substitution jeopar-
dizes the insular properties of a flexible exchange rate
system.3
EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS AND
MONETARY INDEPENDENCE
Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates, each monetary authority was obligated to main-
tain the foreignexchange value of its currency within a
specified range by intervening directly in the foreign
exchange market. When the foreign exchange value of
its currency rose to the upper bound of this r-ange, the
monetary authority sold its currency for foreign ex-
change in the foreign exchange market. This action
increased the supply of “home” currency relative to its
demand and lowered its foreign exchange value. The
monetary authority continued increasing the supply of
currenty until its value declined. If the for’eign ex-
change value of its currency fell to the bottom of the
permissible range,the centralbank would purchaseits
own currency with its foreign exchange reserves,
thereby increasing its own currency’s value in thefor-
eign exchange market.
No Monetary Independence Under
Fixed Exchange Rates
The obligation to maintain its currency’s foreign ex-
change value reduces the domestic monetary author-
31t should be noted that, even under a flexible exchange rate regime,
monetary independence may be lessened by the existence of inter-
national capital mobility. For a discussion of the effects of capital
mobility on the insular properties of flexible exchange rates, see
Tower and Willett (1976). It alsoshould be noted thatcentral banks’
attempts to maintain a desired exchange rate by intervention may
thwart the advantages of a flexible rate system.
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ity’s ability to conduct a policy independent of those
conducted by other countries.To seethis,first assume
that the domestic and foreigneconomies initially are in
equilibrium. If the domestic monetary authority in-
creases its moneysupply, the immediate result will be
an excess domestic supply of money. Consequently,
domestic residents will attempt to reduce their excess
holdingsofmoney by purchasingmore goods, services
and securities, both domestic and foreign. Such ac-
tions impart upward pressure on the general level of
domestic prices and, concurrently, downward pres-
sure on the foreign exchange value of the domestic
currency.4
Since the monetary authority is obligated to defend
its currency’s foreign exchange value under a fixed
exchange rate system, the resultant downward pres-
sure on the exchange value requires it to purchase its
own currency in the foreign exchange market with
foreigncurrency. Obviously, this operation results in a
decrease in the domestic money supply, reversing the
initial expansion. In otherwords, having tomaintain its
exchange rate precludes the domestic monetary au-
thority from independently changing its own money
supply.
It is also the case that monetary shocks can be trans-
mitted from one economy to another. Consider, for
example, the impact of an increase in the money sup-
ply of country A on country B in a two-country world
of fixed exchange rates. As described above, the initial
excess supply ofmoney in Acauses the exchange value
ofA’scurrency to fall relative to B’s. When A’s monetary
authority intervenes, it buys its own currency, using its
holdings of B’s currency to pay for the transaction.
Consequently, B’smoney supply must rise as B sells its
holdings of country A’s currency for more of its own.
This, in turn, generates an excess supply of money in
country B. Thus, the original monetary expansion in A
has been transmitted to B because each country is
obligated to maintain exchange rates within a pre-
scribed range.
Monetary Independence Under flexible
Exchange Rates
Under a system of flexible exchange rates, however,
this inability to control the domestic money supply
4For a moredetaileddiscussion of exchange rate movements,central
banks’exchange rateobjectives and their impacton domesticmone-
tary policy, see Batten and Ott (1983, 1984).
need not exist. With no obligation to maintain its ex-
change rate, the monetary authority can increase its
domestic money supplyand allowthe exchange rateto
fall. A system offlexibleexchangerates also pr’ovides an
environment in which monetary disturbances need
not be transmitted from economy to economy; the
exchange rate simply fluctuates freely in response to
relative movements in money supplies. Thus, as long
as the monetary authority iswilling to let the exchange
rate move as the market dictates, it can follow any
domestic monetary policy that it desires.
What If Currency Substitution Exists?
The curteney substitution argument suggests that
this analysis mistakenly ignores the possibility that
foreign currency is a substitute in demand for domes-
tic currency.5 That is, residents demand both domestic
and foreign currencies. Advocates of this argument
point to certain evidence of the existence of currency
substitution.6 For example, multinationals, among
others, hold various currencies simultaneously in
order to reduce the costs offoreign transactions and to
provide certain risk-decreasing benefits typically
associated with asset diversification.7 As Miles has
noted recently,
significant currency substitution does not require even’
little old lady on Main Street to hold foreign money. All
thatis required is a significant subset ofindividuals and
enterprises which on the margin are indifferent be-
tween holdinganotherdollarof theirmoney portfolio in
domestic versus foreign ~
5See, for example, Mckinnon.
6Our analysis focuses only on “onshore” substitution, that is, the
substitution of foreign for domestic money balances by domestic
agents. A second type, which we do not address directly, is “off-
shore” substitution — the substitution of one foreign-currency-
denominated asset for another by domestic agents. Chrystal, and
Chrystal, Wilson and Quinn (1983)analyzethis secondtype and find
significant offshore currency substitution. Most of this substitution
involves interest-earning assets; consequently, its primaryimpact is
on interest rates. Since we analyze onshore substitution within the
framework of money demand (see below),whatever indirect impact
offshoresubstitution may haveshould becaptured by the inclusion of
the domestic interest rate in equation 1. (See discussion on p. 8.)
7Miles (1978a) has arguedthis. One may question the transactions
motive as a significant reason for holding foreign currencies in a
non-interest-earning form, especially since many highly liquid, in-
terest-earning assets are available in the Eurocurrency market. An
argument may be made for holding these balances for speculative
purposes, however; nonetheless, given the availability and easy
access to the Eurocurrency market, one may discount the currency
substitution argument on apriori grounds alone.
8Miles (1984), p. 1203.
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The mere holding ofa diversified portfolio ofcurren-
cies, however, is not sufficient for currency substitu-
tion to be meaningful. These holdings must also
change in response to changes in the relative opportu-
nity costs of holding foreign money balances. That is if
individuals actually hold a diversified portfolio of cur-
rencies, then they will respond to changes in the cost
of holding one currency relative to another by chang-
ing the relative amount of each currency held. This
readjustment of currency holdings (that is, currency
substitution) enables monetary shocks to be transmit-
ted (via money demand) from one economy toanother
even in a world of flexible exchange rates.
To illustrate this possibility, assume that country B’s
monetary authority strives to maintain a targeted
growth path for a narrow, transactions-oriented,
monetary aggregate. tn aworld of currency substitu-
tion, residents in both countries hold both B’s curren-
cy and A’s currency. Now suppose that country A’s
monetaty authority increases its domestic money
supply while B’s money supply remains unchanged.
tmmediately, money holders (individuals and firms;
expect A’scur’rency to depreciate relative to B’s.With a
flexible exchange rate system in effect, the central
banks do not intervene to maintain the prevailing ex-
change rate. The expected depreciation ofA’scurrency
increases the opportunity cost of holding it relative to
B’s currency. Consequently, residents of both coun-
tries will desire to hold less of A’s cur-rency and rela-
tively more of B’s; that is, both the domestic and the
foreign demand for B’s currency will increase because
of achange in country A’s monetary policy. Thus, fail-
ui-c by policvmakers in B to recognize the external
effects on dortiestic money demand may lead to inap-
propriate policy actions. AsMcKinnon ar-gues, “cur-
rency substitution destabilizes the demand for indi-
vidual national monies so that one can’t make much
sense out of year-to-year changes in purely national
monetaty aggregates .1
For another illustration of how currency substitu-
tion may affect domestic policy actions, assume that
the domestic monetary authority in country B is
attempting to peg some domestic interest rate. Asbe-
fore, assume that countty A unilaterally expands the
growth of its money stock. This again produces an
expected depreciation of A’s currency r’elative to B’s
and, for a given level of income and interest rates,
°McKinnon,p. 320.
increases the domestic and foreign demand for B’s
currency. For a fixed (in the short run) supply of
money, the increase in B’s money demand leads to an
increase in market interest rates. Since the assumed
policy ofthemonetary authority in country B is to pega
domestic interest r-ate, It must offset this increase in
rates by increasing its money supply. Thus, the policy
action taken by country A leads to a similar action by
country B if there is currency substitution and if the
monetary authority attempts to tar-get on a market
interest rate.
In summary, the most important problem with cur-
rency substitution is that it may destabilize the domes-
tic demand for money, thus hobbling a monetary au-
thority’s attempt to determine policy independent of
foreign influences. Consequently, the impact of any
particular monetary policy stance on the domestic
economy maynot be the desired one even inaworld of
flexible exchange rates.
THE EMPIRICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION
That currency substitution may exist and that It may
reduce the insulating properties of flexible exchange
rates are not sufficient reasons to conclude that it
significantly lessens the degree of monetary indepen-
dence among countries under- aflexible exchange rate
regime. Whether curtency substitution is sizable
enough to have the impact described above is an
empirical issue.
The Test
A commonly used procedure to test for the impor-
tance ofcurrency substitution is to estimate adomes-
tic demand fot- money equation and determine if
changes in the opportunity cost of holding a foreign
currency significantly influence holdings of domestic
real money balances. More formally, the following
equation is estimated:
(1) In )M/P)m = a0
+ PrInym + I3iRm + ~3E~
+ ft,ln)M/P)m_, + Er,
where M = the domestic nominal money stock,
P = the domestic price level,
(M/P( = the domestic real money stock,
y = a measure of domestic real income or
wealth,
R = a domestic nominal interest rate,
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E = the expected return from holding foreign
money balances, and
in = the natural logarithm.~)
We measure the expected return from holding
foreign money balances with the expected rate of
appteciation/depreciation of the exchange rate as ap-
proximated bythe three-nionth forward premiumldis-
count.
(2) E* = [IF/S(
4
—1J x 100,
where Fi sthe three-month forward exchange rate be-
tween a specific foreign currency and the U.S. dollar-,
and S is the spot (cur-rent) exchange rate between the
same two curr-encies.
Equation I allows for a relatively broad test of the
currency substitution hypothesis. If domestic resi-
dents consider foreign cur-rencybalances and for-eign-
currency-denominated, interest-earning assets (forex-
ample, Eurocurrency assets) to be substitutes, the
domestic interest rate variable (H) in equation 1 will
capture this behavior; the telatively uninhibited inter-
national mobility of capital requires that interest rates
worldwide (adjusted for expected exchange rate
changes) be equal. Consequently, foreign inter-est rate
changes not totally compensated for by expected
changes in the exchange r-ate will produce concorn-
itant movements in domestic interest rates and, subse-
quently, the normal money demand tesponse.
On the other hand, if people are holding non-
interest-earning foreign money balances for’whatever
purpose (transactions or’ speculative), the expected
change in the exchange rate represents the opportu-
nity cost of holding these foreign balances. Testing for-
this type of currency substitution r’equir-es determin-
ing whether the addition of E* to a standard domestic
money demand eqiration significantly improves the
explanatory power of the equation. For’ currency sub-
stitution to have an impact, the estimated coefficient
on E* should bestatistically significant and negative; as
the expected return from holding foreign money bal-
ances rises, other things equal, individuals will hold
r-elatively smaller domestic real money balances. tf
these two conditions are not met, the currency sub-
stitution hypothesis will have been rejected by the
statistical tests.
‘°Thisspecification is taken from Bordo and Choudhri (1982). For
otherstudies employing the money demand function as the tool of
analysis, see Cuddington (1983), Daniel and Fried (1983) and
Spinelli.
Empirical Results
We investigate theexistence ofcurrency substitution
in five countries: Canada, France, Germany, the Neth-
erlands and the United Kingdom.’1 In each instance,
the U.S. dollar is assumed to be the foreign currency
that substitutes for the relevant domestic curr’encv.’2
The data used are quarterly observations and ar’e sea-
sonally adjusted at the source. For each country, the
income measur-e is real GNPor real GOP, depending on
availability; the price level is measured by the relevant
GNP or GDP deflator; and the interest rate is a short-
term one.’3 The money stock used is always the nar-
rowly defined aggregate (MI(, enabling us to ibcus on
the possible impact of currency substitution on the
ability to control the money stock held for transaction
purposes — the measure most closely associated with
changes in economic activity.’4
Because the sample periods extend back to the mid-
1960s, estimating equation 1 without regard to the
possible effects ofthe change inexchange rate regimes
that occurred in the early 1970s would cloud the inter-
pretation of the E* variable. To circumvent this prob-
lem without reducing the number of observations, we
estimate the effects ofcurrency substitution using 0,1)
interactive terms to separate the fixed and flexible
exchange rate periods. Thus, Ei equals the value of E*
for the fixed exchange r’ate period and zero elsewhere;
E2equals the value of E* for theflexible exchange rate
period and zero elsewhere. In this manner, the differ-
entialeffects of cur’rency substitution, ifthey exist, can
be contrasted under the two exchange rate regimes.
Estimates of equation I first were obtained exclud-
ing E* as an explanatory variable. The individual coun-
try estimates (and their’respective sample periods( are
‘‘Cuddington also has investigated this issue for several countries.
Unfortunately, he fails to recognize changes in exchange rate re-
gimes and their possible effects on the estimated parameters.
“Testsalsow!re conductedusing the German DM forwardpremium
to calculate E’. Theseresults are consistent with those reported in
the paper.
“The countries using GNP are Canada, Germany and the Nether-
lands. GOP is usedforFranceand the United Kingdom.The interest
rates used are: thethree-month interbankdeposit rateforGermany,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; the three-month prime
finance companypaperrate for Canada; andthe three-month inter-
bank money rate against private paper for France.
‘4For an analysis of the relationship between Ml and economic
activity in the countries examined here(excluding the Netherlands).
see Batten and Hafer (1983).
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presented in table i’~ ‘t’he estimated coefficients
generally have the theoretically expected sign and are
significant at acceptable statistical levels. The overall
explanatory power- of each equation is quite high; the
fl25 indicate that the right-hand-side variables explain
at least 90 percent of the variance of real money hold-
ings. Moreover, except for- the Netherlands, theDurbin
h-statistics indicate that the ordinary least squares
estimates are not plagued by first-order autocorrela-
tion. In the case of the Netherlands, a first-order cor-
rection adequately solves the problem.
With respect to available money demand estimates,
theestimated coefficients in table 1 seem quite reason-
able.’” For instance, the estimated average speed of
adjustment of actual real balances to desired (1— ~4( is
about 15 percent per quar-ter. The average long-mn
income elasticity l~,/(1-‘-j34(( is estimated to be 0.76,
with only the German estimate (1.20) appearing out of
line. The interest elasticities also appear reasonable;
the average short-run elasticity is — 0.034, although
there is a wide range of point estimates.
To examine the extent of currency substitution, the
variables Ei and E2are added to the equations in table
I; these results are presented in table 2. As indicated
earlier, if currency substitution between a particular
‘5Following Bordo and Choudhri, the domestic interest rate and the
expected change in the exchange rate variables are estimated in
nonlogarithmic form.
‘6See Boughton (1981) and references therein.
foreign currency and the U.S. dollar is relevant, the
estimated coefficients on these variables should be
negative and statistically significant. The results in
table 2, however, indicate that there is little statistical
support for currency substitution in our sample of
countries, The estimated coefficients on the E terms
generally are not statistically significant. Moreover, the
estimated parameters do not always have the pre-
dicted negative sign.’7
Only for Canada and Germany during the flexible
exchange rate period is there astatistically significant
(at the 5 percent level) effect.18 Although the effect is
“We tested for the impact that exchange controls in the United
Kingdom may have had on the reported results. Our evidence
indicated that accounting tor these controls and their abolition in
1979 did not alter the results reported in the text. Furthermore, we
also estimated the set of equations using a seemingly unrelated
regression procedure. These resultswere notqualitatively different
from those presented.
‘8The Canadian result is contrary to that found by Bordo and
Choudhri,and Cuddington. Thedifference in the resultsstems from
the different sample periods used: Bordo and Choudhri, andCud-
dington both ended their sample period in 1979, whereas oursam-
pleextends into 1983. When we estimated our equations through
1979, we alsofound no statistical effectofcurrencysubstitution: the
estimated coefficient on E2 is —0.202(x 10 2) with at-statistic of
—1.50. Adding the p,ost-l979 observations providesthe statistical
significance of the £2 variable, because the variance of the £2
variableduringthe post-1979 periodis muchlargerthanbefore. For
instance, the mean value of the absolute change in the forward
premium is 0.83 for the period 111/1970 to IV/1979. The variance
during this period is 0.32. In contrast, from I/I980 to IV/1983, the
mean valueincreases sharply to 1.30, and thevariancealso risesto
1.47, Thus,the statistical significance in ourstudy relativeto earlier -
works results from including more recent data.
9FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1984
/ -
/4 //~ /- //// ~




44 4:4/ 44 14’ /74
* /:K //~ -\ ~/ 7
7 ‘k/ /1-7/~%/ /-~ /4 4 7
/4/’ / ‘4 / 4
statistically significant, the economic significance of
currency substitution for each country is quite small.
For example a 1 percent increase in the forward pre-
miumldiscount (E*) during the flexible-rate period in-
duces Canadians to lower their holdings of Canadian
real money balances by only 0.0007 percent, on aver-
age. Fur-thermore, since the largest quarterly change in
E* during the flexible exchange rate period was 4 per-
centage points, the largest quarterly change in Cana-
dian real money holdings motivated by achange in the
expected appreciation/depreciation of the U.S. dollar
was 0.012 percent.”’ Likewise, a 1 percent increase in E*
for Germany during the flexible-rate period induces a
0.003 percent decline in real money holdings, on aver-
age, and the largest quarterly change in real money
holdings caused by a change in E* was 0.015 percent.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Theoretical discussions suggest that the presence of
currency substitution may defeat the policy-insulating
properties of aflexible exchange rate regime. Under a
system of fixed exchange rates, monetary authorities
must maintain the exchange rate within some fixed
range. Consequently, policy actions taken by aforeign
‘9The economic significance of currency substitution also is ques-
tioned by Laney, Radcliffe and Willett (1984). Basedon estimates
forthe United States,they findthat a 100basis-point increase in the
foreign opportunity cost of holding domestic dollar balances re-
duces holdings of domestic currency by only 0.025 percent. It
should be noted, however, thatthe model fromwhichthis estimateis
derived (based on Miles(1978a)) hasbeen criticized by Bordoand
Choudhri, and Spinelli.
central bank that upset the prescribed exchange rate
between domestic and foreign mnoney r-equir-e domes-
tic monetary authorities to increase or- decrease their
money stock to stabilize the exchange rate. Under a
flexible exchange regime, however, the rate is allowed
to move with mar-ket forces. In this way, pr-ices — that
is, the exchange rate — adjust to clear’ the market for
currencies without the need for- intervention.
In a world offlexible exchange rates with currency
substitution, policy responses may regress to those
more common to afixed exchange rate regime. This is
because domestic holdings ofmoney are influenced by
changes in the opportunity costs of holding domestic
and foreign currencies. When the possible impact of
such currency substitution was subjected to empirical
investigation, it generally was found to be statistically
insignificant. In the two countries (Canada and Ger-
many) where currency substitution was found to have
a statistically significant effect, the magnitude of the
effecton real money holdings was minimal. Thus, con-
trary to recent ar-guments, it does not appear that cur-
rency substitution significantly compromises mone-
tary independence in a systemn of flexible exchange
rates.
REFERENCES
Batten, Dallas S., and R. W. Hafer, “The Relative Impact of Mone-
tary and Fiscal Actions on Economic Activity: A Cross-Country
Comparison,” this Review (January 1983), pp. 5—12.
Batten, Dallas 5., and MackOtt. “FiveCommon Myths About Float-
ing Exchange Rates,” this Review (November 1983), pp. 5—iS.
________ “What Can Central Banks Do About the Value of the
Dollar?” this Review (May 1984), pp. 16—26.
10FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1984
Bordo, Michael 0., and Ehsan U. Choudhri, “Currency Substitution Friedman, Milton, “The Case for Flexible ExchangeRates,” in Mil-
and the DemandforMoney: Some Evidencefor Canada,” Journal ton Friedman, ed., Essays in Positive Economics (University of
of Money, Credit and Banking (February 1982), pp. 48—57. Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 157—203.
Boughton, JamesM. “Recent Instability of the Demand forMoney: Laney, Leroy0., Chris0. Radcliffe,and Thomas0.Willett, “Curren-
An International Perspective,” Southern Economic Journal(Janu- cy Substitution: Comment,” Southern Economic Journal (April
ary 1981), pp. 579—97. 1984), pp. 1196—200.
Boyer, Russel S. “Currency Mobility and Balance of Payments McKinnon, Ronald I. “Currency Substitution and Instability in the
Adjustment,” in Bluford H, Putnam and0. Sykes Wilford,eds., The World DollarStandard,” AmericanEconomic Review (June1982),
MonetaryApproach to InternationalAdjustment (Praeger, 1976), pp. 320—33.
PP~184—98. Miles, Marc A. “Currency Substitution, Flexible Exchange Rates,
Chrystal, K. Alec. “Demand for International Media of Exchange,” and Monetary Independence,” AmericanEconomicReview (June
American Economic Review (December 1977). pp. 840—50. 1978a), pp. 428—36,
Chrystal, K. Alec, Nigel D. Wilson, and Philip Ouinn, “Demand for ________ - “Currency Substitution: Perspective, Implications, and
International Money 1962—1977,” European Economic Review Empirical Evidence,” in Putnam and Wilford, eds,, The Monetary
(May 1983), pp. 287—98. Approach to International Adjustment (Praeger, 1 978b), pp. 170—
Cuddington, John T. “Currency Substitution, Capital Mobility and 83.
Money Demand,” Journal of International Money and Finance ________ . “Currency Substitution: Reply,” Southern Economic
(August 1983), pp. 111—33, Journal (April 1964), pp. 1201—03.
Daniel, Betty C., and Harold0. Fried, “Currency Substitution,Postal Spinelli, Franco, “Currency Substitution, Flexible ExchangeRates,
Strikes, andCanadian Money Demand,”Canadian JournalotEco- and the Case for International Monetary Cooperation,” IMF Staff
nomics (November 1983), pp. 612—24. Papers (December 1983), pp. 755—83.
Dornbusch, Rudiger. “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dyna- Tower, Edward, and Thomas D. Willett, The Theory of Optimum
mics,” Journal of Political Economy (December 1976), pp.1161— Currency Areas and Exchange-Rate Flexibility (International Fi-
76. nance Section, Princeton University, 1976).
11